Vietnam's security objectives in Mekong Basin governance by Hensengerth, Oliver
Citation:  Hensengerth,  Oliver  (2008)  Vietnam's  security  objectives  in  Mekong  Basin 
governance. Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 3 (2). pp. 101-127. ISSN 1559-372X 
Published by: University of California Press
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/vs.2008.3.2.101 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/vs.2008.3.2.101>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/8126/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to  third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
  1 
Vietnam’s Objectives in Mekong Basin Governance 
 
This is an Author’ Accepted Manuscript published in the Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 
copyright The University of California Press.  
 
Please cite as: 
 
Hensengerth, Oliver (2008) ‘Vietnam’s Security Objectives in Mekong Basin Governance,’ 




The paper examines Vietnam’s foreign policy as is translates into strategies towards 
subregional cooperation in the Mekong Basin. Using transboundary water cooperation as 
example, the paper argues that Vietnam’s prime motivation in Mekong cooperation is 
economic development for performance legitimacy. Environmental issues are raised, too, but 
only in relation to powerful upstream countries, while Vietnam poses itself such challenges to 
less powerful downstream countries. The need of performance legitimacy thus conveys all 
relevance to the economically-oriented Greater Mekong Subregion, while the Mekong River 
Commission is sidelined as a basin organization with a mandate to combine economic 
development with environmental considerations.    
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Introduction  
This article examines Vietnam’s post Cold War foreign policy towards subregional 
cooperation in the Mekong Basin. Looking at the Mekong River Commission and the Greater 
Mekong Subregion, it argues that strategies of Vietnam towards subregional Mekong 
cooperation do not include ideas of a common good as they are enshrined in the principle of 
human security1. In relation to water, human security issues in Vietnam are raised with 
relevance to the protection of the ecology of the agriculturally intensive Mekong Delta, which 
marks the end point of the transboundary Mekong River. This relates to river pollution and an 
equitable allocation of water resources, which in Vietnam depends on economic activities in 
upstream countries. As last in the line of Mekong countries, Vietnam feels particularly 
vulnerable to dam-building activities especially in China, which controls the source of the 
Mekong. Dams influence the amount of economically relevant fish stock, influence wet and 
dry season flow and thus the water that can be diverted for agriculture in downstream 
countries. Sedimentation and salinization are important issues here. Therefore, dams for 
energy production and irrigation in upstream countries, so the fear in Vietnam, affects food 
production especially in the Mekong Delta. However, Vietnam also regards water ways as 
important transport routes and sources of energy to spur economic development in order to 
create sufficient jobs for young people. The building of dams at the Sesan River, which flows 
from Vietnam to Cambodia, is a case in point and makes environmental concerns expressed 
against the Chinese dams look tactical, the more so since Vietnam is a downstream country on 
the Mekong, but sits upstream on the Sesan. As a result, we have a multitude of strategic 
interests in water use in Vietnam, most of which ultimately refer to economic development, 
an important factor of political stability. It is hence possible to argue that environmental 
considerations pertaining to the Mekong Delta have more to do with economic development 
than with environmental protection.  
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This is bad news for the Mekong River Commission: the commission with its mandate of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is theoretically committed to combine 
economic development and human security, especially in the field of environmental 
protection. Instead, however, subregional cooperation is used to achieve a narrow definition 
of the national interest, which holds up ideas of a nation state in the interest of which foreign 
policy is pursued. It is thus a state-centered approach to policy making in Vietnam, which 
only slowly sees the interest of non-state actors in the field of environmental protection 
influencing the foreign policy agenda of Hà Nội.  
 
This has two consequences: first, subregional Mekong cooperation, although being a cross-
boundary exercise, is dominated by national egoisms. As a result, policies towards 
multilateral cooperation are defined in terms of political stability needs of Hà Nội, of which 
performance legitimacy through economic development in the absence of communist 
ideology forms the essential part. Second, and following from this, multilateral cooperation is 
dominated by an economic development paradigm, which has little or no regard for human 
security but focuses on political stability. To discuss these issues, the article will examine how 
Vietnam’s foreign and security policy strategies translate into policies towards two 
subregional governance mechanisms in the Mekong Basin, which have received international 
attention for more than a decade: the Mekong River Commission (MRC: Ủy họi sông Mê 
Công) and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS: Tiểu vùng Mê Công mở rộng, or Chương 
trình hợp tác Tiểu vùng Mê Công mở rộng), and their strategic relevance for Vietnam’s 
security outlook.  
 
The end of the Cold War and the rise of Mekong cooperation  
In the wake of the end of the Cold War, Hà Nội’s attachment to ideological blocs was 
replaced by the need for multilateral cooperation. The first step was made in 1986, when the 
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government in Hà Nội started the economic reform program of Đổi Mới [Renovation]. Đổi 
Mới was initiated on the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986. In addition to the economic 
changes, the politburo adopted Resolution No. 2 in 1987 in order to initiate a ‘strategic 
readjustment in Vietnam’s security policy’: withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos and 
reduction of the standing army2 in order to adjust to the new Soviet policy of perestroika and 
glasnost under Gorbachev. To sustain Đổi Mới, a multi-directional foreign policy was adopted 
in the politburo resolution No. 13 of May 1988. This policy was changed on the Seventh Party 
Congress in June 1991 to a policy of ‘making friends with all countries’. The congress 
adopted a policy of diversifying and multilateralizing foreign economic relations [đa phương 
hóa và đa dạng hóa quan hệ kinh tế đối ngoại] with all countries and economic organizations. 
Initiated two years after Đổi Mới had been put in place, the new foreign policy resulted in a 
rapid expansion of foreign economic relations, which have led to membership in five 
governance mechanisms in the Mekong Basin. The following table shows what exists and 
who is a member.  
 
Table: Institutional Arrangements in the Mekong Basin 
GMS ASEAN-
MB 




Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam   Vietnam  
Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia  Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia 
Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos 
Thailand Thailand Thailand  Thailand  Thailand Thailand 
Myanmar Myanmar   Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar  
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China China   China    
Abbreviations: GMS: Greater Mekong Subregion; ASEAN-MB: ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development 
Cooperation; MRC: Mekong River Commission; FCDI: Forum for the Comprehensive Development of 
Indochina; QEC: Quadripartite Economic Cooperation; AEM-METI: AEM-MITI/METI Working Group on 
Economic Cooperation in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar; ACMECS: Ayeyawadi-Chao Phraya-Mekong 
Economic Cooperation Strategy 
  
Consequently, the global post-Cold War changes brought about a new security perception, 
which marked a change from a Vietnam which viewed itself as part of the socialist ‘bloc,’ to 
Đổi Mới as new guideline according to which foreign policy was formed. This nexus between 
economic cooperation, national security and domestic stability informs the goals, which 
Vietnam’s government wants to achieve through multilateral cooperation. Overall, Vietnam 
pursues three foreign policy purposes in subregional cooperation: to ‘diversify foreign 
relations in a new global environment; improve relations with former adversaries (especially 
Vietnam-China relations); [and] demonstrate trustworthiness in international relations in order 
to reach long-term goals such as WTO membership’3, which was reached on 28 December 
20064. We will now turn to the examination of these goals in relation to the Mekong River 
Commission and the Greater Mekong Subregion.   
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The relevance of the Mekong River Commission and the Greater Mekong Subregion for 
Vietnam’s foreign policy 
The Greater Mekong Subregion was formed in 1992 at the initiative of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) as an economic cooperation scheme. It includes all Mekong 
riparian states: China and its two provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, Thailand, Laos, 
Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. The Mekong River Commission was formed in 1995 as 
successor of the dysfunctional Mekong Committee, which was inaugurated in 1957 but soon 
found it difficult to cooperate effectively due to the Vietnam War and the Cambodia conflict. 
While the Mekong Committee was founded as an economic cooperation scheme, the Mekong 
River Commission is an organization with the aim to pursue Integrated Water Resources 
Management.  
The agenda change happened against the background of the experience of 
industrialized countries, which had started to incorporate considerations of environmental 
protection into policies of economic development5. It can therefore be argued that the agenda 
change from the Mekong Committee to the Mekong River Commission reflected Western 
ideas – and thus policies of donor countries – of a combination of economic development and 
environmental protection. However, given the emphasis of the link between multilateral 
economic cooperation and domestic stability in member countries, member countries tend to 
ignore the IWRM mandate of the MRC.  
Therefore, the Mekong River Commission forms only another multilateral body in 
Southeast Asia, through which international contacts can be forged. Indeed, when the author 
interviewed Vietnamese researchers and governmental advisors in Hà Nội in the Academy of 
Social Sciences and the Institute of International Relations on the significance of the Mekong 
River Commission for Vietnam, the interviewees without exception did not talk about the 
environmental aspects. Instead, the interviewees quickly switched from the Mekong River 
Commission as conversational topic to issues concerning economic cooperation in the Greater 
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Mekong Subregion6. This indicates the relative insignificance of the Mekong River 
Commission vis-à-vis the Greater Mekong Subregion for Vietnam’s security policy.  
The perception of irrelevance from the interviews was supported by a statement of a 
staff member of the MRC in relation to the question of ownership: ‘given that 90% of the 
operational budget comes from the international donor community, the issue of ownership has 
to be raised: if the donors pulled out entirely, the Mekong River Commission would face a 
serious challenge and its operational capacities would be severely reduced’7. Technically, this 
shows a lack of funds coming from member countries. Strategically, it shows a lack of interest 
in member countries to make the Mekong River Commission ‘their’ organization, as they 
have done with the Greater Mekong Subregion – aided financially by, most importantly, 
Japan and the Asian Development Bank. It also indicates that the human security element in 
transboundary river cooperation is only slowly entering the foreign policy agenda and so far 
has to give way to the river as a source of unrestrained economic development. This in turn 
shows the lack of a strong environmental policy within the central government, hinting to a 
low status of environmental issues in the government vis-à-vis the economics-related 
ministries. It also indicates the government’s disinterestedness to strengthen the 
environmental capacities of the MRC. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development as 
the body in charge of MRC contacts has the function to oversee flood and typhoon protection 
systems, hydraulic structures, wetland management, and rural water supply and sanitation8. 
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment has no role here. In the context of the 
difficulties to reconcile economic growth and environmental protection, Dara O’Rourke 
argues:  
 
The Vietnamese government asserts that it is exploring economic policy 
measures, including pricing mechanisms such as taxes and fees, to increase 
efficiency of use of scarce environmental resources. However, a cynical reading 
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of environmental policy in Vietnam might lead one to argue that policies are 
designed to satisfy the demands of external actors such as aid agencies, and to 
some degree internal demands to stop the worst polluters, but are specifically 
designed to minimize negative impacts. This would be a rational policy design 
from the perspective of a government that justifies itself through rapid economic 
growth9. 
 
The irrelevance of the MRC emerging from the interviews is supported by the findings of 
Philip Hirsch and Kurt Mørck Jensen10. With regard to the MRC, they say that legislation and 
policies of Vietnam rarely mention the Mekong River Commission despite a range of national 
laws and organizations, which are to deal with the MRC as liaising bodies between the 
national and the multilateral level. For instance, in a report by Vietnam’s Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development on the role of River Basin Organizations, the Mekong 
River Commission is not mentioned at all. The Law on Water Resources No. 8 of 20 May 
1998 lacks mechanisms for its legal enforcement and is too general to be applied to a 
particular purpose. Instead, the law was used to set up a number of water administration 
agencies, although without assigning them distinct functions, which means administrative 
confusion as to the responsibilities of these agencies: the National Water Resources Council 
in the Department of Water Resources Management of the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment11; the General Office of River Basins Planning Management (= the General 
Office for RBOs, sometimes also called the General Office of River Basins Organizations12) 
in the Department of Water Resources under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development; and the Office of River Basin Planning Management Board (= the RBO 
Office).  
These bodies also lack skills and a large enough budget to carry out functions assigned 
to them. Furthermore, there is no cooperation mechanism between the two ministries, which 
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are responsible for water resources management: the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development13. Formally, both 
ministries have separate mandates: the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment deals 
with state water management functions in the form of water resources management, while the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development deals with public water services in the form 
of irrigation and drainage services14. In practice, however, other water-related ministries are 
involved: for instance, members of the National Water Resources Council of the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment are: the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
the Ministry of Fisheries, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of 
Construction, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of 
Public Health15. A similar intrusion can be observed in the domain of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development: almost all of the ministries mentioned were involved in 
the establishment of the General Office of RBOs16. 
In addition to the administrative confusion, the Vietnam Water Partnership, the 
Vietnamese arm of the Global Water Partnership, ‘has no role in developing river basin 
management plans’17. The body in the Hà Nội administration in charge of liaising with the 
MRC is Vietnam’s National Mekong Committee18 (VNMC: Uỷ ban sông Mê Công Việt 
Nam), chaired by the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development. The three vice-
chairmen are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment. Interestingly enough, however, 
the VNMC, apart from advising the prime minister on cooperation plans with the other MRC 
members, also helps the prime minister to ‘protect Vietnam’s interests in exploiting water and 
other resources in the Mekong Basin’19. All the MRC members’ NMCs ‘lack a coherent 
basinwide approach’20. 
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Therefore, it can be argued, that Vietnam has continued to regard the MRC as an 
organization to facilitate economic development in the spirit of the 1957 Mekong Committee. 
While the MRC Secretariat sees itself as an organization with the task to reconcile economic 
development and environmental protection through Integrated Water Resources Management, 
the GMS has taken over the task to develop the economies along the Mekong River without 
recourse to environmental security.  
In the proceedings of the first GMS ministerial conference, published by the ADB in 
1993, the environment receives 6½ lines of attention. The problem makes its first appearance 
well hidden at the end of a list of issues to be tackled in the GMS, saying that deforestation 
and drought have to be prevented in the development of forestry and hydropower sectors of 
the GMS program21; at least, the environmental problem is acknowledged as a transnational 
issue that ‘cannot be resolved on a country-by-country basis’22. Environmental concerns then 
re-appear as simple afterthought to the development of the Mekong as key source of energy, 
forestry, fishing, agriculture and transportation development23. To be sure, the environment 
has received more attention in the course of events: the ADB adopted a new environment 
policy in November 2002, GMS members formed a working group on the environment, 
launched the Core Environment Program in 2005, which includes the GMS Biodiversity 
Conservation Corridors Initiative24, and opened an Environment Operations Center on 26 
April 2006. However, pronouncements to tackle environmental degradation seem to be little 
more than a sop thrown to Western observers and donors, the more so since the environmental 
problems associated with economic development are clear to policy makers in the region, but 
are sidelined in favor of an unrestrained development of the economy (mining, hydropower 
etc.)25. The Mekong River Commission rarely moves beyond the stage of planning, feasibility 
studies and workshop discussions, which enables it to accumulate a vast technical knowledge 
base. However, prevailing mistrust between member countries do not enable the commission 
to turn the accumulated knowledge into practice and produce tangible results26, as does the 
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GMS with its quickly expanding infrastructure linkages in the transport, energy and 
telecommunications sectors. Also important in this respect is China’s refusal to join the 
Mekong River Commission on the grounds of the consensus provision in the 1995 founding 
document.  
In short, it is the interest of riparian states in the pursuit of economic development 
unbound by environmental regulations, which contrasts with the GMS environment program. 
It seems thus that the GMS now pursues the economic functions of the old Mekong 
Committee: from an organizational and historical point of view, the MRC is the successor of 
the Mekong Committee. However, when the Mekong Committee became the MRC, the 
economic agenda of the Mekong Committee changed to one of more environmental 
sensibility under the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management. It could therefore 
be argued that regarding the agenda, the real successor of the Mekong Committee is not the 
MRC, but the GMS.  
 
The Mekong River Commission v. the Greater Mekong Subregion? 
The fact that member states ignore the environmental agenda of the MRC in favor of 
unrestrained economic development within the GMS framework is not the only reason for the 
weakness of the MRC. A second important reason is that the MRC embodies Western ideas of 
institutional cooperation according to which rules can be legally enforced. The MRC is based 
on this conception, which is alien to East and Southeast Asia, where a different political 
culture exists. This political culture, which has been termed the ‘ASEAN way’ of an informal, 
consultative and evolutionary mode of cooperation, has found application in the Mekong 
Basin, where it is called the ‘Mekong spirit’. The MRC, with roots in the Mekong Committee 
of 1957, can be seen as a failed exercise in Westernization of cooperation in Southeast Asia in 
that it lacks ownership of the central governments27. The concept of regionalism, which is still 
embodied in the MRC, is a concept of a 1950s regionalism that was foreign to the region, 
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firstly because it stemmed from European practice of an ever deeper economic integration that 
would eventually be joined by a political integration; and secondly because its rationale was 
concerned with balance of power strategies and not a promotion of regional awareness28. 
Consequently, within the governmental bureaucracies of member states, the MRC does not 
play a significant role, neither as an institution nor as regards its Western-conceived IWRM 
agenda. A part of this problem is that the MRC Secretariat is not chaired by an expert from 
the region, but by an expatriate: until the end of September 2003, it was chaired by Joern 
Kristensen, followed by Olivier Cogels on 1 July 2004. Cogels finished his term in 2007. The 
position is currently vacant.  
For the GMS, the picture is different for two reasons: first, the GMS is grounded in the 
political culture of East and Southeast Asia as it has transferred the ‘ASEAN way’ to the 
Mekong Basin calling it the ‘Mekong spirit’; second, the GMS is owned by central 
governments in that they are represented in the GMS committees on the ministerial level and, 
through summits, on the levels of heads of state. The initiative to establish the GMS came 
also from the region, namely from the ADB, which consulted extensively with national 
governments. The author agrees with the argument in Philip Hirsch and Kurt Mørck Jensen 
that the ‘ASEAN way’ or ‘Mekong spirit’ is a dynamic process which has brought Southeast 
Asian states closer together to the point where they have created in a slow evolutionary 
process mechanisms of economic and political regional governance29. However, the author 
does not agree with the argument that these mechanisms, and in particular the MRC, will have 
to move to legally enforceable rules in order to become viable30. The GMS, cited by Philip 
Hirsch and Kurt Mørck Jensen as an example of successful country ownership that has 
created ‘an incipient institutional form’31, does not do that. Nevertheless, through its specialist 
sector working groups, ministerial and post ministerial meetings and summits, the GMS 
achieves a degree of committee governance, which makes the institution of the GMS resilient 
without the need of legally enforceable rules.  
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A review of the ministerial meetings, which are the decision-making bodies of the 
GMS, shows that practice followed the principle of the ‘ASEAN way’ in that no rules were 
established at all. Instead, a practice-oriented approach has arisen, which depends more on 
principles and norms than on rules. The GMS program, that arose from this practice, 
represents the lowest common denominator of the member governments. Looking at the 
evolution of the GMS structure throughout the last fifteen years, we see the steady 
constitution of an increasingly diversified structure of negotiation and confidence-building 
platforms, cutting across several layers of state and non-state – hence sovereignty-bound and 
not sovereignty-bound – actors. This gives rise to an institution, in which a gradual and 
consultative approach of institutionalization accounts for effectiveness and robustness, 
thereby relaxing the notion that only hard rules can foster effectiveness and robustness of 
multilateral institutions. Aided by ADB envoys, interests and cooperation expectations of 
member governments converged. A gradual process was unfolded, which regularized and 
enhanced the frequency of specialized sector meetings and general ministerial meetings, 
leading to stable patterns of cooperation, which are not rule-based, but are based on general 
principles, norms and procedural guidelines. Through this, an effective cooperation 
mechanism was established, from which emerged a system of committee governance, which 
facilitated important inter-governmental agreements such as the Cross-Border Transport 
Agreement32. The expert working groups of the nine working sectors of the GMS program, 
which include, among others, representatives of national ministries, form an integral part of 
GMS governance, deliberation and mutual learning processes. The involvement of national 
ministries allows consensus decision-making during the annual ministerial meetings. The 
working groups ensure coordination of national policies in a cooperative structure, which does 
not involve supra-national decision-making bodies. The frequency and regularity of 
exchanges in the working groups also provide a regular exchange of information and a certain 
transparency and predictability of policies and priorities of member states. The involvement 
  14 
of national governments in the expert committees and the membership of often more than one 
ministry in a particular working group facilitate implementation of the non-binding 
agreements, which characterize GMS cooperation.  
Furthermore, the transgovernmental nature of the GMS and the gradual processes of 
informal confidence-building have created relationships, which resemble Robert O. 
Keohane’s ‘networks of acquaintance and friendship’33. Bearing in mind that in 1991 with the 
conclusion of the Cambodia conflict, countries in the Mekong basin emerged from decades 
and centuries of conflict and mistrust, the inauguration of the GMS project in 1992 was a 
sensitive endeavor. It is against this background that on the occasion of the second GMS 
Summit in Kunming on 4-5 July 2005, Jean Pierre Verbiest, director of the Thailand mission 
of the ADB, said that at the first meeting of GMS officials in 1992, ‘“even at coffee breaks it 
was difficult to get the officials to talk to each other”’34. Consequently, at least in this respect, 
the ASEAN way, which rules out legally enforceable rules, is a success, resulting in stable 
patterns of cooperation supported by favorable governmental policies and aided by the 
mediating activities of the Asian Development Bank in the GMS. These processes and 
cooperation patterns reduce transaction costs and reduce uncertainty by providing enhanced 
access to information for members of the institution in question35. 
The result of this evolutionary cooperation process in subregional governance is that it 
has enabled Vietnam to restructure its relations with former adversaries, in particular China:  
 
[u]nlike Vietnam’s relations with other powers, Vietnam’s relations with China 
are comprehensive and multifaceted. They go beyond state-to-state relations to 
also include party-to-party, province-to-province, and people-to-people [in 
particular through youth exchanges and scholarships] relations. Party leaders tied 
their two countries together in a web of relationships between governments, 
parties, and mass organizations, from the central government down to the local 
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level. In the last decade, no other country has sent more top leaders and 
delegations of all sizes and levels to Vietnam than China, and vice versa36. 
 
The GMS fulfills more than only specific subregional functions. It is part of a more regional 
strategy to reorganize Vietnam’s post-Cold War foreign relations. In this respect, one 
interviewee remarked that the GMS is designed to ‘push Vietnam’s relations with Thailand 
and China’ and ‘enhance intra-ASEAN relations through GMS cooperation’37, thus expecting 
a spill-over effect from the GMS to ASEAN. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has 
experienced increasing regionalization and bilateral as well as multilateral activities. The 
GMS can help improving these trends in the region by enhancing the relations between China 
and Vietnam and eliminate bilateral threats to comprehensive security.38 However, the 
national interests between China and Vietnam differ39, leading to differences in foreign policy 
in which China refuses binding commitments, while Vietnam would like China to become 
more transparent and cooperative in its foreign policy dealings. Yet, since Vietnam and China 
share a border, and both countries need peace and stability to develop their economies40, a 
modus vivendi between China and Vietnam can be established in order to advance relations 
bilaterally and within the GMS. The challenges ahead are that the GMS includes China, but 
China is not an ASEAN country41, a situation in which China has managed not to tie itself 
into binding commitments towards Southeast Asian countries. The interviewees continued 
that therefore, the biggest question for Vietnam is: how to deal with China? It is a powerful 
country that controls the Mekong’s source42. Implicit in this statement is the fear that 
combined with its economic and political power, China is able to develop the river 
unilaterally without consideration for the concerns of downstream countries, as was shown by 
Helga Haftendorn43. It is in this context that according to one interviewee, the ‘GMS should 
promote cooperation between ASEAN and China’44, indicating the hope for a spill-over 
process, in which small-scale cooperation in the GMS positively affects cooperation in 
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ASEAN with regard to the disputed islands in the South China Sea. The overlapping 
membership between the GMS and ASEAN is seen as a chance to narrow the gap between 
ASEAN countries45. Consequently, the GMS has a central function in the reorganization of 
Vietnam’s wider regional relations.  
It is because the GMS can be subjected to these purposes that the GMS as a 
conversational topic (as opposed to the MRC) elicited so elaborate responses during the 
author’s interviews, thus reflecting the neglect of human and environmental security on Hà 
Nội’s foreign policy agenda. 
 
Traditional and human security  
Small scale subregional governance in the Mekong Basin has gained increased importance in 
the security field the more inclusive regional Southeast Asian security cooperation failed to 
achieve the results desired in Vietnam. Hoàng Khắc Nam discussed the ineffectiveness of the 
security architecture in East and Southeast Asia: with reference to the institutional strength of 
ASEAN, he expressed the opinion that a power struggle between the United States and China 
may prevent closer cooperation in that it would be unacceptable for Washington to let 
Southeast Asian countries come under the influence of an assertive China while the influence 
of the United States is in decline, especially against the prospect that a regional cooperation 
under ASEAN+3 could further reduce the role of the United States in East Asia46. 
Furthermore, Hoàng Khắc Nam pointed out that security in East Asia cannot be achieved by 
regional bodies alone but relies on participation from outside the region. In particular the 
notion that the ARF does not wield real power but is ‘simply a consultative platform’47 
expresses disappointment at the conflict resolution capabilities of the inclusive regional 
bodies. In the same vein, Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng criticized ASEAN as being ‘unable to address 
key regional security issues as evidenced by the failure of the Asian Regional Forum to adopt 
a code of conduct in the South China Sea in July 2001’48. The problem that Southeast Asian 
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cooperation bodies rely on outsiders and are therefore prevented to achieve closer cooperation 
was also expressed by an interviewee, who argued that the ten member states of ASEAN form 
a loose grouping, the current formula for implementing decisions being ‘10-x’. It has to be 
noted, however, that this is formula applies to some economic matters, but not to political 
issues. Aside from the economic, cultural and strategic differences, the United States, China 
and Japan have ‘a bit of an incentive to keep this status quo’ in order to secure their influence 
in the region, as ‘China has good relations with Myanmar, the United States has good 
relations with Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, and Japan has good relations with 
Thailand and Singapore’49. The differences came pointedly to light when the United States 
reacted less than enthusiastically to Malaysia’s idea of an East Asian Economic Group in 
1990, and in China’s unsympathetic response to an East Asian Community potentially 
overriding ASEAN+3.50 As a result, there are ‘internal problems as well as external problems 
of generating support for building a stronger community’51.  
In contrast, Mekong cooperation carries the chance to build a closer community in a 
geographically well-defined area. All subregional governance mechanisms including the 
MRC are characterized by a subregional geographical identification (the Mekong River) and 
are therefore restricted as regards membership. Given the fact that political stability in 
Vietnam depends on performance legitimacy of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP: 
Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam), these mechanisms are subjected to the need of ensuring and 
enhancing national security and political stability through rapprochement with neighboring 
states in small-scale subregional cooperation, which exclude some of the cultural and 
economic differences the larger ASEAN and APEC groups exhibit. In addition, the increasing 
transnationalization of problems of human security (such as poverty reduction through 
economic cross-border integration, or environmental protection) forces the government to 
address problems that are transnational in nature and therefore need to be dealt with in a 
multilateral context.  
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This is to say that the human security complex must not be treated as a unitary block 
but needs to be looked at in a differentiated way: poverty reduction as part of the human 
security complex is a focus of the central government, but it serves the purpose of creating 
domestic stability and is therefore not an altruistic motive. Other human security problems, 
such as drug and human trafficking, are on the foreign policy agenda, too. They are part of the 
GMS process and fighting them is synonymous with gaining control over the border areas 
where drug and human trafficking bloom as well as smuggling of manufactured goods – lost 
revenue for the government – and the spread of HIV/AIDS is a rising concern. By cooperating 
in the GMS, the central government therefore also responds to a trend of a localization of 
foreign policy52 and a deterritorialization of the nation state53 in order to try to regain control 
over areas that increasingly defy central control. These transnational issues challenge the 
capacity of the central government and produce a sense of urgency in the central 
administration. As a result, they enter the foreign policy agenda. Given the treatment of the 
MRC and the irrelevance of the national environment and water management bodies within 
the central administration, this cannot be said for environmental security. Consequently, all 
subregional governance mechanisms in the Mekong Basin, in which Vietnam is a member, 
are designed to meet only those problems of traditional and human security, which from the 
viewpoint of the central government and its dominant ministries challenge domestic stability 
and the problem-solving capacity of the central government.  
In this context, a prime concern of Vietnam specific to GMS cooperation is Chinese 
dam-building at the upper flow of the Mekong, which has the Chinese name of the Lancang. 
China is building a cascade of dams on the Lancang, which is accordingly called the Lancang 
Cascade. The cascade is of strategic relevance to China in the context of energy security, as it 
is part of China’s ‘West-East Power Transmission’ project, within which Yunnan supplies the 
booming province of Guangdong with electricity54. For Vietnam, the cascade is related to the 
problem of salinization of the Mekong Delta. This point is raised by Nguyễn Thanh Đức of 
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the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences: 
the benefits of the Mekong Delta for rice production, navigation, irrigation, fishing, hydro-
electric power and tourism, give Vietnam an almost natural interest in the well-being of the 
Mekong. The ecological issues concerning Vietnam are deforestation, erosion, salt intrusion 
due to declining water inflows, pollution and a loss of biodiversity. Floods are increasingly 
affecting agricultural development. To tackle the issues, Vietnam needs the cooperation of the 
upper Mekong countries. The reduction of water resources due to dams, power plants and 
irrigation of the upper Mekong countries, is becoming increasingly difficult and is a major 
problem in Vietnam’s relations with China and raises the issue of future water conflicts. 
While GMS cooperation in other fields is promising, cooperation regarding water resources 
remains difficult55. 
There is, however, no bilateral framework for these problems between Vietnam and 
China, but only an ‘emerging multilateral framework’ within the GMS56. This indicates that 
the GMS does not deal with water conflicts, and that the Mekong River Commission, which 
would have the mandate to do so, has not enough power. Another interviewee argued further 
that there are no clear norms and institutions for problem-solving within the GMS: there is no 
institutionalization, but only an ‘upgrade of cooperation’57. The absence of firm structures in 
the GMS, however, makes it difficult for Vietnam to exert pressure on China through the 
structure of the GMS. Asked by the author if Vietnam ever raises the issue of the Lancang 
Cascade in talks with Chinese government officials, a senior staff of the Institute of World 
Economics and Politics replied that ‘the answer is always diplomatic’58.  
It is here that Timo Menniken argues for an issue linkage of water and non-water 
problems to help reducing the fear of Chinese domination over the allocation of water 
resources and to reduce what Liebman had earlier referred to as China’s ‘trickle-down 
hegemony’59. Arguing that China is able to ‘export’ ‘human and environmental security 
problems’ down the Mekong, the solution to elicit cooperation from China is an alteration of 
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the power equation by moving water conflicts to ‘genuine political bodies such as ASEAN, or 
to economically powerful institutions such as the ADB and GMS’. This would link political 
and economic issues with conflicts over water resources and relieve the Mekong River 
Commission, which has ‘all the information [… but] might not have all the solutions’ given 
the politicization of water issues60. 
The irrelevance of the Mekong River Commission in the solution to water conflicts is 
clearly outspoken here. Moreover, as the discussion on the relevance of MRC and GMS for 
Vietnam’s foreign and security policy showed, the GMS not only produces tangible results in 
economic development, but it also fulfills a number of functions, which deal with specific 
subregional concerns (smuggling etc.) as well as strategic concerns related in particular to 
Vietnam’s post-Cold War reorientation of foreign policy and the strengthening of the 
domestic economy through cross-border integration of its landlocked northern provinces 
along the border to China. In this sense, as argued above, the GMS represents original 
concerns of Vietnam, whereas the MRC – with roots in the Cold War-generated Mekong 
Committee – symbolizes institutional and agenda ideals of European and US origins, which 
have failed to gain acceptance and to induce a sense of exigency (environment, human 
security) within the central government. 
 
Transboundary water disputes and economic cooperation: environment v. economics? 
Given the conflicts between Vietnam and China over the Lancang Cascade and Vietnam’s 
concerns over its Mekong Delta, one would assume that Vietnam has serious environmental 
worries when it comes to the construction of dams. A general opposition to dams, however, 
does not seem to be the case. A conflicting issue between Cambodia and Vietnam is the Yali 
hydro-electric power station on the Sesan flowing from Vietnam to Cambodia. This conflict 
also shows well the weakness of the MRC in the management of subregional water 
governance. The station is on Vietnam’s side of the border. It has been operational since 1991 
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and has caused fluctuations in the river’s flow, significantly affecting Cambodia’s 
downstream ecosystems. Floods damaged crops, periods of low flow have threatened fish 
stock, and an uneven flow increased turbidity and made the water less suitable for drinking. 
The Mekong River Commission has created a bilateral panel to discuss such issues61, which 
so far has not brought forward any results of how to solve the conflict. The disputes with 
Cambodia notwithstanding, Vietnam started construction of a second dam on the Sesan, the 
Sesan 3 Dam, 18 kilometers from the Yali Dam, causing considerable anger among 
Cambodian villagers62 and within the Cambodian government.  
The reason for this is that Vietnam failed to abide by MRC regulations, which 
stipulate that downstream countries have to be consulted before going ahead with the 
construction of dams63. Regarding the Lancang dams, so far, ‘no regional or bilateral 
mechanism has been able to clarify or discuss the issue openly between China and the other 
countries’. Furthermore, the dam issue was not discussed during the second GMS summit in 
Kunming in July 2005, but was the topic of two meetings held parallel to the summit by local 
communities and NGOs in Chiang Rai and Ubon Ratchathani.64 This example strongly shows 
the non-involvement of NGOs in the decision-making processes in the GMS. Consequently, 
the episode illustrates the disregard for human security in general and environmental security 
in particular, thus the weakness of the non-state sector, for the formulation of foreign policy in 
the central governments.  
Ironically, Vietnam, one of the harshest critiques of the Lancang Cascade, receives 
hydropower from Yunnan along with Thailand, which has also been complaining to China 
about negative impacts on the ecology of its rivers and the livelihood of downstream 
communities, but buys energy generated by stations on the Lancang; Thailand is also one of 
the investors in the Jinghong station, which is part of the Lancang Cascade.65 Stanway 
mentions that in the first five months of 2005, China exported 87.2 mln kWh to the GMS. The 
power transmission capacity increased after the second power grid connecting Vietnam with 
  22 
Yunnan became operational in June 2005. At the end of the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-
2010), Yunnan is supposed to be able ‘to dedicate 3 mln kW of capacity to Thailand alone’66. 
Although Chinese politicians recognize the potential effects on downstream ecologies and the 
lives of local communities, who depend on the river water for irrigation and fishing, 
environmental concerns are being sidelined in favor of rapid industrialization of China’s 
south-western regions67.  
Another case, through which Vietnamese complaints about the negative effects of 
upstream dams look strangely at odds with political reality, is that Vietnam is reported to be 
helping Laos with the construction of three new dams68. Furthermore, the World Bank has 
returned to finance dam projects after some time of abstention. In Laos, the Bank has agreed 
to co-finance with the ADB and private investors the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydro-electric 
project through loans to the government in Vientiane. Construction started in June 2005. The 
dam is expected to earn the government 150 million USD per year by selling much of the 
anticipated energy to Thailand. While the Bank argues it has learned its lessons from the 
failure of Thailand’s Pak Mun Dam and has promised to provide money for resettlement, 
restocking of the affected rivers with fish and creation of a wildlife reserve nine times bigger 
than the area flooded by the dam – Vientiane has promised in addition to use parts of the 
revenue for health, education, and rural development – the project has sparked angry protests 
of environmental activists and Thai fishermen, who had been affected by the Pak Mun Dam, 
in front of the World Bank’s offices in Bangkok. Ahead of the loan agreements of 31 March 
2005 (World Bank) and 4 April 2005 (ADB), the World Bank conducted local consultations 
with affected communities from May to August 2004 and held a series of international 
workshops in September 200469. Indeed, the disclosure of an immense amount of information 
on the project and the extensiveness of discussions seem unprecedented in the World Bank’s 
endeavors to build dams, and at least seem to show a new seriousness to take into account 
warnings about social unrest caused by community break-ups, loss of income and food and 
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environmental degradation. It is yet to be seen, however, whether the NT2 yields better results 
than its predecessors and can live up to the environmental and social standards the bank has 
promised to stick to. In a fatalistic manner, a German member of a foreign policy think tank, 
interviewed in June 2005, remarked that attitudes to Chinese dams by downstream countries 
change once the downstream country becomes an upstream country. Consequently, as long as 
the environmental degradation produced by dams and the potentially disruptive nature of the 
destruction of a river’s ecology and the livelihood of river-based communities is not taken 




GMS cooperation has provided a chance for Vietnam to enhance regional integration of its 
economy. The participation in five different cooperation bodies signifies the importance the 
central government attaches to the Mekong Basin. The importance reaches both the 
interlinked domains of economic development and security policy. It does not extend to 
ecological problems of security, which leaves the Mekong River Commission cast aside by 
member countries and kept alive by donor countries71. Mekong Basin cooperation also 
enables Vietnam to diversify its sources of economic development given that Japan, the 
largest stakeholder of the ADB, has a strategic interest in the region and is the main contender 
of China for regional influence. 
Essentially, cooperation over transboundary running waters not only shows well the 
distribution of power within a specific region, but also the readiness of countries to cooperate, 
because many of the problems associated with transboundary rivers, such as pollution, are 
problems which can only be solved through multilateral cooperation, and often by alienating a 
degree of national sovereignty. This is also partly why transboundary rivers are often viewed 
by central and local governments as closed river basins with no concern of the stretches of the 
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river beyond the national border: the river is dammed and the water stored and diverted for 
irrigation and electricity production to spur national economic development partially aimed at 
poverty reduction without regard for the ecology of downstream stretches and therefore also 
without consultation of affected downstream countries and riverside communities. Wolf, 
drawing on his studies of conflicts over international waters, concludes that the history of 
international waters ‘suggests that the simple fact that humans suffer and die in the absence of 
agreement apparently offers little in the way of incentive to cooperate – even less so the 
health of aquatic ecosystems’72. This puts the idea of sustainable development at risk, which 
through the nature of a transboundary river can only be exercised in a multilateral forum.  
Consequently, the only relevant environmental organization in mainland Southeast 
Asia, the Mekong River Commission, is treated by Vietnam as an institution, through which 
water related constructions and plans are realized. But these plans and constructions fulfill an 
economic development function (as can be seen in the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development deals with the MRC on the ministerial level) that nullifies the idea of 
Integrated Water Resources Management which the MRC is supposed to pursue. 
 
Furthermore, GMS cooperation fulfills an original interest in multilateral cooperation, 
while the MRC represents European and US concepts of institutionalization and working 
agendas. The cases of the Mekong and the Sesan, on which Vietnam is a downstream and an 
upstream country respectively, show well the utilitarian character of subregional Mekong 
cooperation, which is perpetuated through a country’s relative power position: power here is 
not solely defined through the geographical position, but foremost through political and 
economic power, through which the geographical position is first cemented and then used in 
order to achieve what lies in the national interest. While Vietnam cannot press China to stop 
building the Lancang Cascade, it can afford to ignore complaints by Cambodia in relation to 
the Sesan hydropower stations in the same way that Beijing can afford to disregard 
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complaints by Hà Nội with regard to the Lancang dams. The Mekong River Commission is 
unable to negotiate in the disputes, whereas the GMS provides an economic development 
forum in which the environment is represented through the biodiversity initiative, but in 
which river development is part of a national interest defined in nation state terms: essentially, 
the transboundary Mekong River is still viewed as a closed national basin, which stops at the 
national border.  
The transboundary character of the Mekong is acknowledged only when the river can 
be developed as a shipping route to export manufactured goods in order to achieve national 
economic development, or whenever it is regarded as a transporting route for drugs, smuggled 
goods or other international criminal activity. In both cases, transboundary activities are 
regarded as influencing the national: the international river is seen as an opportunity for 
national development or a threat to national security. Both impacts on the capacity of the VCP 
to manage and resolve conflicts within Vietnam. Performance legitimacy is therefore the 
primary motivation to engage in subregional cooperation, putting national egoisms above a 
common good. Yet, this ignores issues such as the potential destabilizing impact of 
environmental refugees or declining reservoirs of clean drinking water. As a consequence, by 
following a narrow definition of the national interest, the VCP ignores threats to political 
stability, which arise from policy domains over which the central government fails to see 
exigency to act and which therefore have remained the concern of NGOs without influence on 
the central decision-making processes. 
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